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Abstract
The central claim of the paper is that NL
stringsets are regular. Three independent
arguments are offered in favor of this position: one
based on parsimony considerations, one employing
the McCullogh-Pitts (1943) model of neurons, and
a purely linguistic one. It is possible to derive
explicit upper bounds for the number of (live)
states in NL acceptors: the results show that finite
state NL parsers can be implemented on present-
day computers. The position of NL stringsets
within the regular family is also investigated: it is
proved that NLs are counter-free, but not locally
testable.
0 Introduction
The question whether the grammatical sentences
of natural languages form regular (Type 3),
context free (Type 2), context sensitive (Type 1),
or recursively enumerable (Type 0) sets has been
subject to much discussion ever since it was posed
by Chomsky in his seminal 1956 paper. However,
there seems to be little agreement among the
linguists concerned with the ‘geographic’ position
of natural languages (NLs): for instance Reich
(1969) claims NLs to be finite-state (Type 3),
while Matthews (1979) argues that they are not
even recursively enumerable.
Pullum and Gazdar (1982) have demonstrated
that the standard linguistic arguments against
the context-freeness of natural languages are
fallacious – they did not consider, however, the
metalinguistic argument offered by Matthews. In
Section 1 of this paper I will briefly outline and
challenge this argument, and in Section 2 I will
argue in favor of Reich’s position. The claim
that NLs are Type 3 has several implications for
linguistic (meta)theory: these will be discussed in
Section 3.
The paper presupposes some familiarity with
the basic notions and notations of formal language
theory: when no specific reference is given, the
reader will find a proof both in Salomaa (1973)
and Harrison (1978)
1 Natural languages as formal
languages
The extensional view of natural languages, i.e.
the identification of NLs with the set of their
grammatical strings (sentences) is sometimes
regarded an idea characteristic of generative
linguistics. Since it was Chomsky (1957:18) who
first made this view explicit, this is not wholly
unjust: yet it is quite clear that the same idea was
implicit in much of the work of the structuralist
period.1 In fact, the ‘discovery procedures’
developed by the structuralists in order to arrive
at a concise description (grammar) of a NL
from a set of utterances (corpus) were without
exception based on the assumption that native
speakers of the language are capable of judging
the grammaticality of utterances presented to
them. Although these procedures are, by
and large, practical (empirical) and mechanical
(algorithmic), their presentation already involved
a certain amount of idealization.
For instance, it is obvious that native speakers
themselves utter ungrammatical sentences from
time to time, and it is also clear that they can
understand (parse) sentences that are not strictly
‘grammatical’. Nevertheless, these methods work
quite well in the actual practice of NL description,
and the structuralist methodology has often been
compared to that of chemistry, physics, and other
natural sciences.2 Matthews (1979) has casted
1See e.g. Def 4 in Bloomfield 1926, or Harris 1946
ch 1.0
2See e.g. Carroll 1953, Levi-Strauss 1958 ch. 2
doubts on the fundamental assumption of these
procedures: he claims that native speakers are
in fact unable to judge the grammaticality of
material presented to them. The relevant part of
his argumentation is reproduced below:
“Consider (1) and (2). If native speakers
instantiate
(1) the canoe floated down the river sank
(2) the editor authors the newspaper hired
liked laughed
an effective procedure in their classification of
sentences, then presumably the classification of (1)
and (2) should not depend on their position in a
list of test sentences that also includes sentences
similar to (3) and (4).
(3) the man (that was) thrown down the stairs
died
(4) the editor (whom) the authors the
newspaper hired liked laughed
but in fact it does. (1) and (2) will typically
be classified as ungrammatical if they precede
sentences similar to (3) and (4), but grammatical if
they follow them. Such cases are quite common.”
(p 212)
Moreover, “there is considerable empirical
evidence to suggest that native speakers employ
a battery of heuristic strategies when parsing
and classifying sentences. Their reliance on such
strategies does not preclude their having available
to them an effective procedure for deciding
membership in their language; however, in the
absence of empirical evidence for such a procedure,
we are certainly not required to postulate its
existence.” (p 213)
From this, Matthews concludes that Putnam
(1961) was not justified in appealing to Church’s
thesis in order to show that NLs are recursive: for
if native speakers have no effective procedure for
deciding membership in the set of grammatical
sentences, then there is no guarantee that such
procedure exists. But is it really the case that
the “battery of heuristic procedures” employed by
native speakers falls outside the scope of Church’s
thesis? Well- confirmed natural laws3 are usually
taken to be universally valid – it is unclear why
should Church’s thesis be an exception to this,
and Matthews offers no evidence to corroborate
his views on this point.
Putnam’s original argument derives its
3For independent motivation of Church’s thesis, see
e.g. Rogers 1967: ch. 1.7
strength from Church’s thesis. If NLs are not
Type 0, then the heuristic strategies of native
speakers will be instances of precisely that sort
of procedures that Church’s thesis predicts not
to exist: on the one hand, they are ‘intuitively
effective’, and on the other hand, they are not
Turing computable.
The phenomenon observed by Matthews,
namely that native speakers can be coaxed into
accepting (or rejecting) sentences has little to do
with the recursiveness of the battery of heuristics
they employ: rather, it calls the extensional
view of language in question. The problem is
a methodological one: if NLs are defined to be
sets of grammatical sentences, how can one test
potential elements for membership? This problem
becomes particularly acute in borderline cases
(such as (1-4) above), and for the linguist who
wants to check the predictions of his grammar it
matters but little that such dubious sentences are
(statistically) infrequent.
The easiest way to solve this problem is to
give up the assumption that grammaticality is
a yes/no question: ‘degrees of grammaticalness’
can be introduced (see e.g. Chomsky 1961) and
NLs can be treated as graded (or even fuzzy)
sets. This approach, however, can only be applied
in the study of idiolects (languages of individual
speakers), because there is no way to arrive at a
graded set that will reflect the sum of individual
opinions in a reasonably faithful manner.
Suppose, for instance, that we have three
speakers, X, Y, and Z, and each of them classifies
the sentences a, b, and c consistently (that is, if
he prefers a to b and b to c, then he prefers a to
c, etc.). Now, if for speaker X a > b > c, for Y
b > c > a, and for Z c > a > b, then the majority
prefers a to b, b to c, and c to a; in other words, the
‘general opinion’ is inconsistent (non-transitive).
The “possibility theorem” of Arrow (1950) makes
it clear that the example is typical: under very
general conditions, there is simply no way to
aggregate graded sets in such a manner that
the (partial) orderings imposed by the individual
gradations are preserved. Therefore, the ‘degrees
of grammaticalness’ approach must be relegated to
the study of idiolects in any case – most linguists,
however, reject it entirely (see Newmeyer 1980 ch.
5.5.2, 5.7.1).
Yes/no grammaticality judgments, on the
other hand, show remarkably little variation
from speaker to speaker in any given speech
community, and it is this intrasubjective testability
(cf. Itkonen 1981) that justifies the empirical
study of ‘dialects’ and even ‘languages’. But if
Matthews is right, and native speakers are unable
to “classify any sentence over the vocabulary of
their language consistently as either grammatical
or ungrammatical” (p 211), then intrasubjective
testability will be impossible to achieve. The
question is: what makes the native speaker
inconsistent? In Matthews’ example, there can be
little doubt that the cause of the inconsistency is
the test situation: the speaker’s linguistic intuition
is not the same before and after reading sentences
(3-4).
This source of inconsistency can be eliminated
fairly easily: if the sentences are presented in a
random manner (preferably, with “filler” sentences
among them), then no “cues provided by the
context of classification” (p 213) will be present.
Naturally, linguistically relevant experiments will
have to control many other factors (see e.g.
Greenbaum and Quirk 1970), but as we shall see,
there is no need to discuss these individually.
From the point of intrasubjective testability, it
can be safely said that well-designed experiments
usually provide highly consistent data (even in the
case of borderline sentences), and the extensional
view of NLs can be maintained on an empirical
basis as well. The actual sets designated as NLs
will, at least to a certain extent, depend on the
choice of experimental technique, but any fixed
experimental method can be thought of as an
algorithm for deciding questions of membership
with the aid of a human oracle.4
Since the existing experimental methods can
be replaced by (interactive) computer-programs,
the question boils down to this: is a Turing
machine with a human oracle more powerful than
one with a Turing machine oracle? By Church’s
thesis, the answer is negative, and as Turing
machines with recursive oracles are no more
powerful than Turing machines without oracle (see
e.g. Rogers 1967 ch. 9.4), NLs must be recursive.
Notice, that this line of reasoning is inde-
pendent of the particular choice of experimental
technique, or what is the same, of the precise
definition of NLs. This is a consequence of the fact
that the experimental methods used in empirical
sciences (including linguistics) hardly merit this
name unless they are well-defined and ‘mechanical’
to such an extent that their algorithmization poses
4For the definition of oracles, see e.g. Rogers 1967
ch. 9
no real problems. (For instance, the procedure
outlined above does not make crucial reference
to random sequences: the ’randomization’ of
test-sentences can be carried out with the aid
of pseudorandom sequences generated by Turing
machine.) This is not to say that introspective
evidence or intuition plays no role in linguistics
(or in general, in the development of science) –
but questions concerning the position of natural
languages in the Chomsky hierarchy can hardly
be meaningful unless we have some definition
of NLs (i.e. some experimental method to test
membership) to work with.
2 The regularity of natural
languages
Finite state NL models were first developed by
Hockett (1955). Although Chomsky (1957 ch 3.1)
attempted to demonstrate the inadequacy of such
models, several linguists5 advocated their use,
and the stratificational school of linguistics (Lamb
1966) persists in employing a formalism which is,
in essence, equivalent to finite automata (cf. Table
1 of Borgida 1983).
As Reich (1969) has pointed out, Chomsky’s
demonstration is based on the assumption that
NLs are self-embedding to an arbitrary degree.
This means, that the sentences (1-2) and (5-6)
must be equally grammatical:
(5) the boss editor authors the newspaper
hired liked hates laughed
(6) the committee boss editor authors the
newspaper hired liked hates chairs agreed
The experiments (Miller and Isard 1964, Marks
1968), however, do not support this conclusion:
native speakers of English react to (5-6) and (7-8)
the same way6
(7) the boss editor authors the newspaper
hired liked hates laughed cursed
(8) the secretary committee boss editor
authors the newspaper hired liked hates chairs
agreed
Since (7-8) are ungrammatical in any grammar of
English, Chomsky’s original demonstration is far
from convincing, and the question whether NLs
5Especially the ones working with computers. See
e.g. Marcus 1964, Church 1980
6Chomsky (1963) regards (5-6) grammatical (but
unacceptable) and (7-8) ungrammatical: for the
methodological implications of this position see
Greene (1972).
are Type 3 is still open.
In fact, the only way to show that NLs are
not finite is to exhibit some infinite sequence of
grammatical sentences: fortunately, the pattern
exemplified in (1-6) is not necessary for this.
Coordinated constructions as in
(9) I have seen Tom
(10) I have seen Tom and Dick
(11) I have seen Tom, Dick and Harry
can be as long as we wish: the grammaticality
of such sentences is independent of the number
of conjuncts. Similar (right- and left-recursive)
patterns can be found in any NL, but all of
these can be described by regular expressions.
Therefore, if grammars do not have to account for
iterated self-embeddings, the principle of scientific
parsimony will point to the minimal language
family accommodating every possible finite NL
corpus and their regular extensions. From this
perspective, the Type-3 family is more than
sufficient: since it contains every finite language
and is closed under regular operations, it provides
a generous upper bound for the family of NLs.
A more direct argument can be based on
the biological make-up of the human brain: as
individual neurons can be modeled by finite
automata (McCulloch -Pitts 1943), and a finite
three-dimensional array of such automata can
be substituted by one finite automaton (see
Kleene 1956), NLs must be regular. Although
finite state models of NLs usually do not claim
“neurological reality” (see ch 3.2 of Sullivan 1980),
the above reasoning gives us an upper bound on
the complexity of finite automata necessary to
describe NLs: since the relevant part of the brain
contains no more than 108 cells, and one cell has
cca. 102 − 103 states, non-deterministic automata
with 1010
9
states will be sufficient.
Since the neurological organization of the
human brain is unlikely to parallel the actual
organization of the (internalized) grammar of
native speakers, it is not surprising that the
application of linguistic methods gives a much
sharper upper bound: as we shall see, finite
deterministic NL acceptors need not have more
than 1016 states. This estimation can be derived
from the investigation of the syntactic monoids
defined by NLs. (For the definition of syntactic
monoids, see McNaughton–Papert 1968, and for
a systematic exposition, see ch 3.10 of Eilenberg
1974.)
Elements of the syntactic monoid correspond
to the distributional classes of structuralist
linguistics: two strings will belong to the same
class if and only if they have the same distribution,
i.e. iff they can be substituted for each other in
any sentence of the language in question. The
distributional classes formed by strings of length
one will be the elements of the terminal alphabet;
but it should be kept in mind that these function
as preterminals inasmuch as each of them stands
for a (not necessarily finite) class of elements. In
a morpheme-based approach, terminals are called
morpheme classes: these can be set up by the
procedure outlined in ch 15 of Harris (1951).
In a word-based approach, that is, if we take
words to be the ultimate syntactic constituents,
the terminals will be called lexical (sub)categories:
in either case,7 the number of terminals is clearly
finite. There are no more than 20 lexical
categories; and in any given NL there are less
than 300 morpheme classes. However, fully
formed words with different inflexional affixes will
belong to different distributional classes, and if
we want to maintain the regularity of lexical
insertion, lexical entries (e.g. verbs or verb
stems) with different subcategorization frames
will fall in different subclasses. Traditional
accounts of lexical (sub)categorization also allow
for overlapping classes (in cases of homonimy).
For the sake of simplicity, I will take the Boolean
atoms of such systems as basic: this way, elements
like ‘run’ or ‘divorce’ will be neither nouns nor
verbs but will be listed under a separate category
for ‘noun-verbs’.
But even if we take all these factors into
account, it can be safely said that the number
of morpheme classes does not exceed 103 and
the number of lexical subcategories does not
exceed 104 in any given NL. In other words,
it is possible to select for any given NL a
‘core vocabulary’ (or morpheme list) of 104(103)
elements in such a manner that every word
(morpheme) not appearing in the list will be
distributionally equivalent to one already on it.
This means that the number of states that can
be reached in one step from a given state of a
finite state NL acceptor cannot exceed 104 and
conversely, any given state can be reached from at
most 104 states in one step.
The states of finite automata are in one-
7Present-day syntacticians seem to favor the latter
approach: for discussion see Robins (1959), Chomsky
(1970), Lieber (1981).
to-one correspondence with the classes of right-
distribution: two strings over the terminal
vocabulary will take the (minimal) automaton to
the same state iff they can be substituted for
each other in every right-side environment. As
a special case, it should be mentioned that those
strings that do not appear as initial parts of
grammatical sentences will give only one state
in the automaton: these, therefore, can be
disregarded. The remaining strings (i.e. the
ones that can be finished grammatically) have
a property peculiar to NLs: they can always
be finished with at most four words (or twelve
morphemes).8 This means that the final state9
of NL acceptors can be reached from every live
state in at most four (twelve) steps. Therefore,
the number of live states is at most 1016(1036).
3 Consequences
It should be emphasized that the above estimation
is still very generous: a systematic study of
sentence endings is highly unlikely to reveal more
than 105 different patterns in any given NL,
and the proper order of magnitude seems to be
104. If the automaton has to account for the
morphology of the language as well, 106 − 107
states will be necessary – this is, perhaps, outside
the capabilities of present-day computers. In any
case, finite automata can be implemented on any
theoretical (or actual) model of serial computation
like Turing machines, random access machines,
etc. to accept languages in linear time.
Although native speakers understand gram-
matical sentences in real time, their performance
as NL acceptor is somewhat hindered by the
fact that the heuristic algorithm they use is
not adopted to ungrammatical strings: usually
they spend some (limited) time with deliberation,
and sometimes they want to hear the input
string a second time. But even in this (worst)
case recognition happens in linear time, and in
this respect at least, finite automata constitute
realistic models of native speakers.
The importance of this fact for linguistic
metatheory should not be underestimated: those
frameworks (like transformational grammar, see
Rounds 1975) that generate languages with
8This property is a linear version of the Depth
Hypothesis (Yngve 1961).
9For the sake of simplicity I have supposed
that sentences in embedded position are freely
interchangeable, i.e. that there is only one accepting
state.
exponential (polynomial) recognition complexity
make the prediction that there are problems
which can be solved both by humans and Turing
machines in a measured time, with humans
showing an exponential (polynomial) gain over
machines in the long run. For instance, Lexical-
Functional Grammar (see Bresnan 1983) makes
the claim that humans can solve certain NP-hard
problems in linear time (cf. Berwick 1982), and
this is not very likely. On the other hand, those
frameworks (like Generalised Phrase-Structure
Grammar, see Gazdar 1982) that generate only
languages of polynomial time complexity might
have some psychological reality; at least there
is nothing in present-day complexity theory that
precludes the possibility of one implementation
(e.g. multi-tape Turing machines, or, for that
matter, the brain) gaining a small polynomial
factor over another one (e.g. single-tape Turing
machines).
Another advantage of Type 3 NL models
is that they make the problem of language
acquisition solvable, at least theoretically. It
is well known that no algorithm can decide
whether a context-free grammar generates a given
context-free language: therefore, if every (infinite)
context-free language is a possible NL, Church’s
thesis will make it impossible for the child to
acquire one, not even in case they have access
to an oracle (say, the parents) that tells them
whether a string belongs to the language or not.
Therefore, it is sometimes supposed that the
primary linguistic data accessible during language
acquisition contains not only strings, but the
associated tree-structures as well. But if NLs are
regular, the problem is solvable without recourse
to this rather strange assumption: given an upper
bound on the number of states in the canonical
automaton generating the language, it is possible
to reconstruct the automaton in a finite number
of queries (Moore 1956). Since the number of
queries is at least 1012 even if the child has access
to a ‘representative sample’ of 104 sentences that
reaches every live state in the automaton (see
Angluin 1981), and it is impossible to make more
than 106 queries in a lifetime, NLs must form a
proper subset of regular languages.
In fact, there is reason to suppose that every
NL will be non-counting. Specifically, a string
xy4z will belong to some NL if and only if xy5z
is also in it. This is obvious if y is a coordinate
conjunct – as certain languages differentiate
between singular, dual, trial, and plural, the
number 4 cannot be reduced. If y is the repeated
part of some left- or right- recursive construction
(e.g. a that -clause), five copies will be just as
grammatical as four copies were: the converse also
seems to hold. If this characterization of NLs is
true, the traditional mode of language description
in ‘tactical’ terms is fully justified, because every
non-counting language can be built up from the
elements of the alphabet using only catenation
and Boolean operations (McNaughton-Papert
1971). Conversely, as the traditional phonotactic,
morphotactic, and syntactic descriptions of NLs
used only catenation, union, intersection, and
sometimes complementation (in the form of
‘negative conditions’), the generative power of the
Item and Arrangement model (see Hockett 1954)
does not exceed that of counter-free automata.
It is also possible to develop a lower bound
for the family of NLs: the phenomenon of
syntactic concord over unbounded domains (which
I suppose to be present in every NL) will guarantee
that NLs cannot be locally testable. The following
demonstration is based on a regular expression
used by Pullum- Gazdar (1982): coordination (the
outermost Kleene *) has been added in order to
create non-initial and non-final elements that have
to agree with each other.
(12) ((Which problem did your professor say
((she + you) thought)* was unsolvable) + (Which
problems did your professor say ((she + you)
thought)* were unsolvable))*
Suppose, indirectly, that English is k-testable for
some fixed k, and consider the following strings:
(13) ((Which problem did your professor
say (she thought you thought)k was unsolvable)
(Which problems did your professor say (she
thought you thought)k were unsolvable))2
(14) ((Which problem did your professor say
(she thought you thought)k were unsolvable)
(Which problem did your professor say (she
thought you thought)k was unsolvable) (Which
problems did your professor say (she thought you
thought)k was unsolvable) (Which problems did
your professor say (she thought you thought)k
were unsolvable))
Apart from the order of the conjuncts, the
only difference between (13) and (14) is that
in the latter subject-predicate number agreement
is violated in the first and the third conjuncts.
Therefore, (14) is ungrammatical, but it has
the same subwords of length k (and with the
same multiplicity) as the grammatical (13). This
contradicts our hypothesis that English was k-
testable.
Hopefully, this special position of NLs in
the Chomsky hierarchy can be utilized in
streamlining the (oracle) algorithms modeling
language acquisition, because such algorithms
(if actually implemented) would greatly simplify
the descriptive work of the linguist, and, at
least to a certain extent, would finally fulfill the
structuralists’ promise of discovery procedure.
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